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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover money for purchases made
with credit cards issued by Respondent to Appellants.
Appellants contend that their liability for the purchases is
limited to $50.00 under 15

u.s.c.

§

Respondent contends

1643.

that Appellants' liability is governed by contract.

The two

cases involve identical contracts and nearly identical facts.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court granted Respondent summary judgment against
each Appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the District Court's
judgments.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Appellant Harlan

In July, 1979, Appellant Harlan, who was prior to that
time a VISA cardholder at Respondent bank, requested that John
Harlan be added to the account as an authorized user.

(Harlan

R. 32-33, 35) Respondent honored this request and issued Mr.
Harlan a VISA card.

(Harlan R. 32, 35)

At some point between

July and the end of 1979, Appellant Harlan informed the bank
that she either wanted the account closed, or wanted the bank
to deny further extensions of credit to her husband.

R. 28-37)

{Harlan

These requests included two letters with identical

-2-
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I

wording but different dates, both signed by Appellant Harlan.
(Harlan R. 36, 37)

The date of one of those letters, October

11, 1979, is clearly inconsistent with Appellant Harlan's sworn
affidavit, in which she states that she and her husband
separated in November, 1979.

(Harlan R. 36, 28)

The letters from Appellant Harlan also claimed that
she no longer had possession of her VISA card, that •(m)y VISA
was destroyed in the AM-PM teller (•machine• in the second
letter) at the bank."

{Harlan R. 36, 37)

Yet Appellant Harlan

returned the VISA card to the bank three months after the
latter of the two letters, in March 1980.

(Harlan R. 34)

When

Appellant Harlan ref used to pay any amounts owing on the VISA
account, respondent instituted suit.
B.

(Harlan R. 7)

Appellant Jones

Respondent established VISA and Master Charge accounts
for Appellant Jones at Appellant's request in 1977.
39, 40)

(Jones R.

On or about November 11, 1977 Appellant Jones wrote

two letters to Respondent, indicating that she would no longer
honor charges on the two accounts made by her husband, Richard
Jones.

(Jones R. 75)

Respondent revoked both accounts and

made numerous attempts by letter and otherwise to retrieve the
cards from Mr. and Mrs. Jones.

(Jones R. 59-61, 75-76)

Despite the numerous notices of revocation and requests for
surrender of her card, Appellant Jones continued to make

-3-
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charges against the accounts and ref used to return her card
until March 8, 1978, when an employee of Respondent visited
Appellant Jones' work place, and retrieved her card.
72-73, 75-76)

(Jones R.

Appellant Jones refused to pay the outstanding

balances on the accounts, and Respondent instituted suit on
December 12, 1978.

(Jones R. 2-10)
ARGUMENT

I.

A.

LIABILITY FOR APPELLANTS' HUSBANDS' USE OF THE
CARDS IS NOT GOVERNED BY 15 U.S.C. § 1643, THE
"UNAUTHORIZED USE STATUE"

Appellants' husbands are not "unauthorized users•
within the Congressional intent.
The fifty dollar limitation of liability for

unauthorized use of a credit card, set out at 15

u.s.c.

§

1643,

and relied upon by Appellants, was not intended to limit
liability in the present fact situation.

During the 1960s, the

growth of the credit card industry led to the growth of credit
card fraud.

Murray, •A Legal-Empirical Study of the

Unauthorized Use of Credit Cards", 21 University of Miami Law
Review 811 (1967).

The danger that a lost or stolen credit

card could be used fraudulently worried lenders as well as
consumers, since the fear of unlimited liability undoubtedly
deterred some potential cardholders from obtaining cards.
811, 813.

-4-
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Id.

To deal with the problem, Senator Proxmire introduced
legislation to limit liability for lost or stolen cards to
fifty dollars.

115 Cong. Rec. 1947 et. seq. (1969)

(hereinafter "CRl").
The legislation was proposed in the context of the
unlimited distribution of unsolicited credit cards.
1947.

CRl, p.

In that context, Senator Proxmire sought to set ground

rules for issuing unsolicited cards and protect consumers if
the unsolicited cards went astray.

CRl, p. 1947.

The threat

of liability for cards lost in transit is a constant theme
throughout the remarks accompanying the introduction of his
bi 11 , S • 7 21 .

CR 1 , pp • 19 4 7 , 19 4 9 , 19 5 2 •

The bill was passed by the Senate with certain
perfecting amendments on April 15, 1970.
(1970), (hereinafter •cR2n).

116 Cong. Rec. 11844

Again, the statements on the

floor repeatedly emphasized that the purpose of the act was to
prevent liability for lost or stolen cards.
11831, 11840, 11841, 11842, 11843.

CR2, pp. 11829,

Senator Proxmire, the

bill's author, said •ct)he second amendment contains a valuable
new requirement that the issuer provide the consumer with a
stamped, self-addressed notification form which the consumer
can use to notify the company of the card's loss or theft."
CR2 at 11842 (emphasis added).

Senator Percy, in presenting

the minority's view, described the effect of the liability

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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limit as follows:

"Once the cardholder notifies the issuer

that his card has been lost or stolen, he retains no liability
for misuse which may occur after that notification.•
11841 (emphasis added).

CR2 at

With regard to imposing criminal

liability of a $1,000 fine or 1 year imprisonment for
unauthorized use, Senator Long said, "I hope that would be
adequate, but it is certainly better than nothing with regard
to people who have been stealing credit cards and using them in
a way that amounts to theft.•

CR2 at 11839

(emphasis added).

In discussing his amendment to bar the distribution of
unsolicited cards, Senator Mcintyre, a cosponsor, said "(t)he
mailing of unsolicited credit cards invites theft and
fraud. • • •

Such cards bear a computer account number and

lack only a signature to validate them.

Therefore, any card

which is misdirected or stolen from the mail may be used by
anyone gaining access to it.•

CR2 at 11831 (emphasis added).

The debate touched on the use of cards by family
members twice.

First, Senator Proxmire noted "(e)limination of

the unsolicited credit card reduces the likelihood that a
family member will get a card without the knowledge of the head
of the household."

CR2 at 11829.

Finally, in perhaps the most

telling commentary of all, Senators Long and Mcintyre carried
on the following discussion of the effect of Senator Long's
amendment adding criminal liability for unauthorized use:

-6-
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Mr. McINTYRE. What happens if the husband
and wife were having marital difficulties
and the wife used her husband's credit card
and he asserted that it was an unauthorized
use of the card? Would the wife take the
risk of going to jail?
Mr. LONG. I seriously considered that with
respect to all relatives--and in conference
this matter could be considered--we would
not involve ourselves; that we would exclude
from the provisions of the act unauthorized
action by a spouse or anyone who was a
direct descendant or ascendant or immediate
member of a family.
We have the situation every day where a
wife is supposed to exceed authorized
spending. Those clashes, which occur from
time to time, are looked on in the law as
more of family disputes than crimes. Many
times, when a husband is in a quarrel with
his wife, from whom he is estranged, he is
accused of kidnaping children. There often
are cases in which a husband accuses a wife
of taking something she is not supposed to
have, or vice versa.
CR2 at 11840 (emphasis added).
The Senate Report was even more explicit:
The purpose of the legislation is to
safeguard the consumer by prohibiting the
issuance of unsolicated credit cards and by
limiting the consumer's liability for a lost
or stolen card to not more than $50. Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, Unsolicited
Credit Cards s. Rep. No. 91-739, 9lst Cong.,
2nd Sess. 1 (1970) (emphasis added).
With few changes, the Proxmire proposal was ultimately enacted
into law as Title V of Public Law 91-508 on October 26, 1970.
That law is now codified at 15

u.s.c.

sections 1642-44.
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The context of the legislation is clear.

It was

enacted to deal with a perceived problem of unlimited
cardholder liability where cards are lost or stolen, that is,
where use was never authorized in the first place.

Congress

never intended the law to apply to the present situation, where
use once authorized is revoked.
B.

Appellants' Husbands' use was not •unauthorized•
within the meaning of 15 u.s.c. § 1643.
The term •unauthorized use" is defined in 15

§

1602

(o)

u.s.c.

(1974) as:

use of a credit card by a person other than
the cardholder who does not have actual,
implied, or apparent authority for such use
and from which the cardholder receives no
benefit.
A lost or stolen card fits this definition.

When a

thief presents the card for use, his signature will not match
the signature on the card's signature line, and his name will
not match the name imprinted on the card.

Without question the

thief has no implied or apparent authority to use the card.
Appellants' husbands, on the other hand, clearly had
apparent authority to use the cards where their signatures were
the same as the signatures on the cards, and where their names
were the names imprinted upon the cards.

See e.g., Martin v.

American Express, Inc., 361 So. 2d 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).

-8-
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The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.
The •apparent authorityw of the Appellants' husbands when they
used the cards excludes them from the definition of
unauthorized use, and consequently from the limitation of
liability of 15 U.S.C.

§

1643.

Any other interpretation of the statute would create
absurd and grossly inequitable results.
fraud would be enormous.

The potential for

The Alabama court, when confronted by

this issue, aptly described one such potential for fraud:
Were we to adopt any other view, we would
provide the unscrupulous and dishonest card
holder with the means to defraud the card
issuer by allowing his or her friends to use
the card, run up hundreds of dollars in
charges and then limit his or her liability
to $50.00 by notifying the card issuer.
Martin v. American Express, supra, at 601.
Another opportunity for such fraud is demonstrated by
the very facts of Appellant Jones' case.

Betty Jones herself

continued to make charges against the account after notifying
Respondent of her husbands alleged •unauthorized use"; and when
Respondent sought to retrieve her cards, she claimed that they
had been destroyed.

Appellant Jones then sought to avoid all

liability for charges made after the notification on the ground
that they were Richards' "unauthorized" charges.

Only by

retrieving f rorn the clearing house numerous transaction slips
and manually sorting though them, all at considerable expense,
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was Respondent ultimately able to determine that not only
Richard Jones, but Appellant Jones herself was continuing to
make charges against the account, (Jones R. 75, 79, 85-90).
How many charges Appellant Jones made is unknown.

The

critical fact is that she tried to avoid liability for the
charges she did make by invoking the unauthorized use statute,
thereby demonstrating the incredible potential for fraud which
would be created if Appellants' proposed construction of 15

u.s.c.

§

1643 were adopted by this court.
Furthermore, even if Appellants' construction of the

statute were correct, the FTC has provided an exception to the
statute when the •cardholder has engaged in fraudulent use of
its credit card.•
F.T.C. 357 (1980).

See, In the Matter of Shell Oil Company, 95
Certainly the issue of fraud is not too far

below the surf ace when the file in the Harlan case shows two
essentially identical letters with different dates and both
files show that the Appellants continued to make use of their
cards while telling the bank that they had no cards, or that
the cards were destroyed, or that all the charges were being
made by their husbands.

(Harlan R. 33-34, 36-37 Jones R. 75,

79) •
C.

Appellant's notification to Respondent did not
trigger the operation of the unauthorized use
statute.

Appellants would have this court accept the
proposition that it is notification to the card issuer which
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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renders use •unauthorized" use within the meaning of the
statute; ergo, the point at which Appellants notified
Respondent terminated their liability.

Appellants have

demonstrated their misunderstanding of the statute by use of
the following paraphrase of it:
•[N]otice to Respondent bank ended the
authorized use of Appellants' credit cards
by their husband, their liability for
charges after the notice is limited to
$50.00 by federal law and regulations.•
Appellant's Brief at p. 13-14.
The statute actually reads:
"(a) A cardholder shall be liable for the
unauthorized use of a credit card only
if . • • the liability is not in excess of
$50.00 • • • and the unauthorized use occurs
before the cardholder has notified the
issuer . • .
(d) Except as provided in this section, a
cardholder incurs no liability from the
unauthorized use of a credit card."
15

u.s.c.

§

1643 (emphasis added).

The statutory language and congressional intent are
exceedingly clear: it is the wrongful use of a card by one who
never had authority to use it which renders the use
•unauthorized• within the meaning of the statute.

The

notification to the card issuer has no bearing on whether the
use is •unauthorized• so as to entitle a cardholder to the
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statutory limitation of liability.

The use is either

unauthorized or it isn't regardless of notification.

Under the

statute a cardholder is liable for only $50.00 in unauthorized
charges regardless of whether or not the issuer was ever
notified; the notification serves only one purpose -- it
/

eliminates the $50.00 liability if it is received before the
unauthorized charges are incurred.
Thus, Appellants' contention that their notification
in and of itself rendered the use unauthorized is totally
without merit.

Their notification is totally irrelevant unless

Appellants can first demonstrate that their husbands' use, with
or without notification, was •unauthorized

8

•

When viewed in the context of congressional intent,
discussed supra, the statute cannot be read any other way.

The

statute was intended to cover use by a thief or other wrongdoer
who never had actual, implied, or apparent authority to begin
with.

Congress never intended the statute to apply to

de-authorized use by a spouse.

The only reasonable analysis to

apply to Appellants' attempt to de-authorize their husband's
use and terminate their liability is whether their actions were
sufficient under the contract.

-12-
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II.

LIABILITY FOR APPELLANTS' HUSBANDS'

USE OF THE CARDS IS GOVERNED BY THEIR
CONTRACTS WITH RESPONDENT

Respondent, like other card issuers, willingly assumes
certain risks when it issues cards to applicants; one of those
risks is that the card will accidently fall into the hands of a
wrongdoer by loss or theft.

In such a case the cardholder has

little more opportunity than does the issuer to prevent the
wrongdoing.

Consequently, the Congressional decision to place

such a risk on the issuer by enacting 15

u.s.c.

1643 is

§

ultimately fair and equitable and is a conscious risk taken by
card issuers.
Quite the opposite, however, is the situation
presented by Appellants.

Appellants themselves created the

opportunity for their husbands to use the cards and they
consciously and contractually assumed the risk.

In reliance on

the contractual promises and the credit rating of the
Appellants, Respondent allowed their spouses to have cards with
their names imprinted thereon; and merchants in reliance upon
the apparent authority demonstrated by the cards allowed the
spouses to make charges.

Now Appellants would seek to shift

the risk and avoid their contracts by invoking the
•unauthorized use• statute.

Appellants' argument· is totally

without merit.
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Appellants had available to them a perfectly adequate
means of terminating their liability, a method provided for in
the terms of Appellants' contracts with Respondents -- simply
returning the cards to Respondent.

Yet Appellants, knowing

full well the requirements for terminating their liability,
refused and failed to take the steps necessary to do so.
Rather they preferred to keep their cards and make additional
charges and then avoid liability by claiming wunauthorized
use.w

Appellants received the benefit of their bargain with

Respondent and should not be allowed to deprive Respondent of
its benefit by a distorted interpretation of the statute.
Instead, Appellants' liability and the termination of that
liability should be governed solely by the contract upon which
Respondent relied in issuing the cards to the husbands.
III.

RESPONDENT HAD NO OBLIGATION TO SUE
APPELLANTS' HUSBANDS

Appellants would have the court inf er some
significance to Respondent's choice of defendants below, i.e.,
the suits were brought only against the wives, and not their
husbands.

(Appellants' Brief Page 6)

Appellants failed to

cite any authority for this unusual proposition with regard to
neccesary parties or indispensability, and Respondent rejects
it.

Further, Respondent directs the court's attention to the

interpretation of the Federal Reserve Board, which declared

-14-
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•that no primary contractual liability on the credit card
account is imposed upon the other spouse (spouse B) merely by
issuing a card at the request of the spouse A."

FRB Official

Staff Interpretation Number FC-0070, 42 Fed. Reg. 25,491
(1980).

Thus Respondent's choice of defendants at the District

Court level was simply in keeping with the Truth-in-Lending
Act, and has no further or independent significance.
IV. THE CASES CITED BY APPELLANTS
SUPPORT RESPONDENT'S, NOT APPELLANTS', POSITION.
Appellants' citation of an Ohio case for the
proposition that a cardholder is not liable for charges by an
authorized user after notification is utterly wrong.

Rather,

the Ohio Court of Appeals held that an authorized user
("recipient of related card") is not liable for cash advances
made to the cardholder.

Cleveland Trust Co. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio

App. 2d 168, 9 Ohio Ops. 3d 329, 380 N.E. 2d 354, 360 (1978).
Furthermore, the Ohio court, in dicta, stated:
That the cardholder is liable for the
charges to his account, made by himself and
by a holder of a related card, is clear.
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Snyder, 380 N.E. 2d at 360.
Respondent urges this Court to follow the careful
analysis used by the Ohio court in reaching the decision they
actually made.
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The New York case cited by Appellants also supports
Respondents' position that it is the contract which governs
Appellants' liability, not 15

u.s.c.

§

1643.

The New York

court held that the cardholder did revoke the account and
terminate his liability for his wife's use where he gave the
card issuer notice and surrendered his card.

Socony Mobil Oil

Co. v. Greif, 10 A.D. 2d 119, 197 N.Y.S. 2d 522 (1960).

The

court went on to suggest that had the credit card contract
explicitly required the surrender of both cards, it would
enforce it.

•plaintiff's contention as to the necessity of the

surrender of both cards has no support in any of the contract
provisions and there seems to us no sufficient basis for
inferring such a condition.•
197 N.Y.S. 2d at 523.

Socony Mobil Oil Co., v. Greif,

This case obviously supports

Respondent's position that the terms of the contract, not 15

u.s.c.

§

1643, govern the termination of a cardholder's

liability for charges made by one whom that cardholder
previously authorized to use the card.
CONCLUSION
The limit on liability for unauthorized use of credit
cards of 15

u.s.c.

§

1643 was not intended by Congress to apply

to Appellants' situation.

Even if it were applicable,

Appellants do not come within the meaning of the statute
because their husbands had •apparent authority• when they used
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the cards.

For these reasons, this court should hold that the

unauthorized use statute does not apply where the use has
previously been authorized and the user did not obtain the
cards by wrongful means, and that it is the contract between
the cardholder and card issuer which governs the liability in
(

such a situation.

The summary Judgments of the Third Judicial

District Court should be affirmed A
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